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In this chapter, I argue that scientific practice in the neurosciences of cognition 
is not conducive to the discovery of natural kinds of cognitive capacities. The 
“neurosciences of cognition” include cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neu-
robiology, two research areas that aim to understand how the brain gives rise to 
cognition and behavior. Some philosophers of neuroscience have claimed that 
explanatory progress in these research areas ultimately will result in the discovery 
of the underlying mechanisms of cognitive capacities.1 Once such mechanistic 
understanding is achieved, cognitive capacities purportedly will be relegated into 
natural kind categories that correspond to real divisions in the causal structure 
of the world. I provide reasons here, however, to support the claim that the neu-
rosciences of cognition currently are not on a trajectory for discovering natural 
kinds. As I explain, this has to do with how mechanistic explanations of cognitive 
capacities are developed. Mechanistic explanations and the kinds they explain are 
abstract representational by-products of the conceptual, experimental and integra-
tive practices of neuroscientists. If these practices are not coordinated towards 
developing mechanistic explanations that mirror the causal structure of the world, 
then natural kinds of cognitive capacities will not be discovered. I provide reasons 
to think that such coordination is currently lacking in the neurosciences of cogni-
tion and indicate where changes in these practices appropriate to the natural kinds 
ideal would be required if it is indeed the goal. However, an evaluation of current 
practices in these research areas is suggestive that discovering natural kinds of 
cognitive capacities is simply not the goal.
A primary aim of the neurosciences of cognition is to understand how the brain 
gives rise to cognitive capacities such as vision, attention, working memory, face 
recognition, reward-based learning, and spatial memory. Cognitive neuroscience 
investigates the neural basis of human cognitive capacities and aims to identify 
which brain regions subserve which capacities. Experiments typically involve 
human subjects performing cognitive tasks or being run through experimental par-
adigms designed to individuate different kinds of cognitive capacities. Functional 
neuroimaging and/or electrophysiological recording techniques are used to deter-
mine which areas of the brain are active during task performance. Non-invasive 
intervention techniques are sometimes used to interrupt brain activity to determine 
its impact on task performance. When such experiments are successful, cogni-
tive neuroscience sheds light on the brain areas that underlie cognitive capacities. 
3 Neuroscientific kinds through 
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Cognitive neurobiology, in contrast, investigates the synaptic, cellular and molec-
ular mechanisms that underlie cognition. Neurobiologists work primarily with 
animal models (e.g., rodents, fruit flies) and combine the behavioral techniques 
of experimental psychology (e.g., classical and operant conditioning paradigms) 
with electrophysiological, pharmacological, genetic and protein analysis tech-
niques. Intervention experiments are commonly used to determine the impact of 
synaptic, cellular and molecular changes on changes in behavior associated with a 
given cognitive capacity. To take an example, an experiment to determine whether 
activation of a specific protein kinase is requisite for a cognitive capacity like 
“spatial memory” typically involves training a rodent in a spatial memory para-
digm (e.g., the Morris water maze) and blocking the activity of the protein kinase 
to determine the impact on performance in that paradigm.
One question that has arisen in recent philosophical debates about the nature of 
neuroscientific explanation is whether the neurosciences of cognition are poised 
to develop categories of cognitive capacities that track natural kinds. At least two 
responses to this question have emerged in the philosophical literature. The first, 
offered by Carl Craver and his collaborators, is that neuroscience not only can 
but also ought to aim to discover natural kinds of cognitive capacities or “mecha-
nistic property clusters (MPCs)” – groups of properties that co-occur and whose 
“co-occurrence [. . .] from individual to individual is explained by causal mecha-
nisms that regularly ensure these properties are instantiated together.”2 Accord-
ing to the MPC account, sciences like neuroscience typically begin by grouping 
phenomena together on the basis of detectable surface features. These prelimi-
nary groupings do not typically track mechanisms. In fact, scientists may wrongly 
“lump” together phenomena that are actually different or incorrectly “split” phe-
nomena that should be grouped together.3 As more is learned about the mecha-
nisms that realize a phenomenon of interest, more appropriate ways to carve the 
phenomena are revealed, and scientists thus revise their groupings accordingly. To 
take an example, originally an entire class of behavioral phenomena was grouped 
together as memory phenomena. However, it was later discovered, via patients 
like Henry Molaison (H.M.), that medial temporal lobe structures underlie the 
ability to explicitly or consciously recall facts and events, whereas other struc-
tures underlie other forms of memory. This prompted “splitting” the category of 
memory. On the MPC view, as more is learned about the mechanisms of memory, 
more revisions are possible.
Proponents of the MPC view and “the ontic account” of mechanistic expla-
nation downplay the role of scientific practice in shaping mechanistic explana-
tions and the kinds scientists discover.4 According to them, it is not scientists who 
explain but rather the mechanisms in the world that do the explaining. Scientists 
merely corral phenomena into groups; causal interventions inform this relega-
tion.5 Mechanistic property clusters or natural kinds are out there in the world to 
be discovered; scientists discover them or they do not. While the MPC account 
contains a normative prescription that scientists should strive to discover these 
clusters, its proponents are relatively silent with respect to how to better facilitate 
their discovery in instances in which a science may struggle to find them.
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In contrast, another advocate for mechanistic explanation in the neurosciences 
of cognition, William Bechtel, points to the cognitive labor involved in develop-
ing mechanistic explanations.6 He contends that “what [a] scientist advances is a 
representation of a mechanism – a construal of it – not the mechanism itself,” and 
that appealing to such representations is fundamental for improving our under-
standing of a mechanism.7 While he admits that these “representations [. . .] may 
not accurately represent the mechanisms operative in the world,”8 he does seem 
to think that correct depiction is the goal. Although he is making a purely descrip-
tive claim about the neurosciences of cognition, he believes that recognizing that 
mechanistic explanations are representations is the only way to make sense of 
Craver’s normative claim that these areas of science ought to discover mecha-
nisms (or MPC kinds). Because explanation cannot be liberated from a repre-
sentational framework, at best what Craver can say, according to Bechtel, is that 
neuroscientists should aim to provide accurate representations of mechanisms. 
That is the closest that science can come to discovering natural or MPC kinds.
I am sympathetic to Bechtel’s claim that representing is equally as important as 
intervening in discovering the mechanisms of cognitive capacities. Yet, represent-
ing and intervening are broad categories of practices that do not by themselves 
exhaust all of the possible types of practices that potentially shape the discovery 
process. According to Bechtel, neuroscientists also decompose systems like the 
brain into structural and functional subcomponents and localize specific cognitive 
functions in specific parts of the brain. In the process of engaging in these heuris-
tic activities, neuroscientists deploy concepts, design experiments, interpret data, 
and combine/integrate experimental findings to support knowledge claims and 
build explanatory models of cognitive capacities. Furthermore, these practices 
take place in different contexts like scientific laboratories, research papers, review 
papers, websites, and conferences. It thus seems reasonable to characterize scien-
tific practice in the neurosciences of cognition as involving many different kinds 
of practices that are relevant to or play a role in the discovery of natural kinds of 
cognitive capacities. Three types of practices that I want to consider here are
1 conceptual practices
2 experimental practices and
3 integrative practices.
By “conceptual practices,” I mean to capture the ways in which investigators 
generally deploy concepts so as to pick out explanatory targets of interest, like cog-
nitive capacities. Such concepts are theoretical constructs that are often only very 
loosely defined. In contrast, the designation “experimental practices” is intended 
to pick out the within-laboratory procedures – experimental paradigms or cogni-
tive tasks – by which investigators specify how to produce, detect and measure a 
cognitive capacity of interest in the laboratory. While experimental paradigms do 
not exhaust the class of within-lab practices that potentially shape the kinds under 
study in the neurosciences of cognition, they are the strategies I will primarily focus 
on here. Finally, when investigators attempt to bring together data emanating from 
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many different laboratories into a coherent model of the mechanisms involved in 
the production of a cognitive capacity, they may be said to engage in “integra-
tive practices.” Discussion sections of research papers and review papers are two 
contexts in which integrative mechanistic or explanatory models are developed. 
Another venue for integrating research study findings are published meta-analyses, 
which are becoming more commonplace in the neurosciences of cognition for 
bringing results from many labs together to bear on questions about functional 
localization and the mechanisms subserving cognitive capacities.
What I aim to show is that the relationship between these three kinds of 
practices is dynamic and this has specific implications for the kinds of cogni-
tive capacities that the neurosciences of cognition discover. To do this, I want 
to appeal to a conceptual framework I introduced previously for thinking about 
what I refer to simply as “the experimental process” (Figure 3.1a).9 Briefly, this 
process begins with an empirical question about a cognitive capacity/function 
of interest (Figure 3.1a). Before an investigator attempts to go in search of the 
neural basis or cellular and molecular mechanisms of a cognitive capacity, she 
typically has grouped together instances of what she takes to be the same capacity 
under a concept or construct. She may rely on how other investigators define the 
concept, but she may also define the term slightly differently. To take an exam-
ple, rats successfully navigating mazes, birds correctly remembering where their 
nests are located and taxi drivers being able to navigate London in the absence of 
maps or GPS are often grouped together under the construct “spatial memory.” 
Other constructs that designate cognitive capacities include working memory, lan-
guage, attention, face recognition and procedural memory (to name only a hand-
ful). Such constructs originate with a concept that investigators associate with 
certain observations that serves as basis for theory building and experimental task/
paradigm design and construction. When investigators deploy such constructs in 
the introduction of research papers in order to motivate a set of experiments, for 
example, they are engaged in such conceptual practices.
Once an investigator has selected a cognitive capacity of interest, which is 
designated by a construct, she then engages in various experimental practices 
directed at investigating that capacity in the laboratory (Figure 3.1a). Most impor-
tantly, she develops an experimental paradigm – a set of procedures for producing, 
measuring and detecting an instance of that capacity in the laboratory – which is 
used in conjunction with imaging or recording technologies (e.g., fMRI, electro-
physiology) and intervention techniques (e.g., TMS, pharmacological inhibitors) 
to identify the brain areas or cellular and molecular mechanisms that underlie 
that capacity. For example, an experimental paradigm used to investigate a cog-
nitive capacity such as spatial memory will include a set of production proce-
dures that specify the stimuli (e.g., distal and local cues) to be presented, how 
those stimuli are to be presented/arranged (e.g., spatially, temporally) and how 
many times each stimulus is to be presented during phases of pre-training, train-
ing and post-training/testing. The paradigm will also include measurement pro-
cedures that specify the response variables to be measured in the pre-training and 
post-training/testing phases of the experiment and how to measure them using 
apparatuses designed for such measurement. Finally, a set of detection procedures 
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Neuroscientific kinds 51
specifies what the comparative measurements of the response variables from the 
different phases of the experiment must equal in order to ascribe the cognitive 
capacity of interest to the organism and/or the locus of the function to a given 
brain area or neuronal population.
An investigator will, in the ideal case, aim to design an experimental paradigm 
that produces an instance of the kind of capacity that she intends to detect and 
measure. She ought to want the match between the effect she produces in the 
laboratory and the phenomena she takes to be grouped together under the general 
construct to be valid. Another way to put this is that she aims for the experimental 
paradigm she selected to have a high degree of “construct validity.” Construct 
validity “is involved whenever a test is to be interpreted as a measure of some 
attribute or quality which is not operationally defined.”10 It “involves making 
inferences from the sampling particulars of a study to the higher-order constructs 
they represent.”11 Experimental paradigms or cognitive tasks may have anywhere 
from a low to high degree of construct validity. The higher the degree of construct 
validity, the closer the match between the effect under study in laboratory and the 
cognitive phenomena designated by the construct.
The final stage of the experimental process is data interpretation (Figure 3.1a), 
in which the investigator determines which hypothesis of the set of competing 
hypotheses about the effect produced in the laboratory the statistically analyzed 
data discriminate. This hypothesis is then taken to be true of the effect produced 
in laboratory. It may then be extended back to the original effect of interest in the 
world that prompted the empirical question about the phenomenon of interest in 
the first place. However, another fundamental component of every research study 
that occurs either within the context of data interpretation or on the heels of it 
involves researchers situating their results within the broader context of the litera-
ture. These comparative practices often combine results from different laboratories 
to arrive at conclusions about the brain areas that underlie (cogneurosci), or the 
cellular and molecular mechanisms that produce (cogneurobio), a give cognitive 
capacity. These practices may be described as “small-scale integrative” practices.
Figure 3.1  The experimental process: conceptual, experimental and integrative practices 
(3.1a) and construct explication (3.1b).
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However, there are also “large-scale integrative” practices in which investiga-
tors bring together multiple different kinds of data from different research studies, 
that occur most commonly in the context of (literature) review papers. One reason 
this is necessary is that data pertaining to the mechanisms of a cognitive capacity 
are supposed to be replicable across different laboratories and different investiga-
tors to rule out the possibility of experimental artifacts. Adina Roskies puts the 
point aptly with respect to cognitive neuroscience in claiming that “convergence 
across multiple experiments is the key to epistemic warrant when it comes to 
attributing function to anatomical regions” and “results from any single study are 
viewed by scientists as providing evidence for one way of parceling out one cog-
nitive function over another, but not as conclusive evidence.”12 A second reason 
why integrative practices are necessary for discovering the mechanisms of cog-
nitive functions is that mechanistic explanations of a cognitive capacity will not 
arise in the context of a single laboratory; rather, they are based on results emanat-
ing from many laboratories situated at the same and different levels of analysis.13
While review papers are a primary context in which results from many differ-
ent laboratories are brought together often in diagrammatic models that depict 
mechanisms, meta-analyses are becoming an increasingly popular tool for bring-
ing data emanating from multiple different laboratories to bear on the question 
of the anatomical location of a single cognitive function in the brain14 and the 
cellular and molecular mechanisms of a given cognitive function. Databases such 
as the Cognitive Atlas (http://www.cognitiveatlas.org) have been created so that 
specific information from research papers that use fMRI and structural MRI may 
be entered into the database and mined for correlations or interesting patterns in 
the data across research studies. The hope is that such meta-analyses will be rev-
elatory with respect to functional localization. Some neuroscientists and philoso-
phers of neuroscience recently have advocated for a similar approach with respect 
to cognitive neurobiological experiments.15
To appreciate the dynamical relationship between conceptual, experimental 
and integrative practices, it is important to note that the experimental process 
within any given laboratory is rarely one-shot. Oftentimes, an investigator and/or 
her critics wonder whether the investigative procedures she has used in the labo-
ratory satisfy the criterion of construct validity. Such worries prompt a process 
known as “construct explication” (Figure 3.1b). This process may be understood 
in terms of a series of questions that also in the ideal case become a fundamental 
part of the experimental process. Specifically, an investigator asks at the relevant 
stages of this process:
1 Which instances of worldly phenomena should be grouped together under the 
concept designating the construct?
2 Which investigative strategies will yield instances that instantiate the 
construct?
3 Are the investigative strategies I have used adequate or should they be 
modified?
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4 Given the data that these investigative strategies yield, should the construct 
itself be revised to exclude phenomena from the category that do not belong 
or include additional phenomena that I deemed were not part of the original 
category?
Historically, a primary aim of efforts in psychology and the social sciences to 
define the concepts of construct validity and construct explication was to improve 
the correspondence between theoretical constructs and the phenomena in the 
world they are intended to designate. Investigators engaging in the conceptual 
practices of construct validation and construct explication was considered the best 
strategy for an area of science to progress towards categories that track natural 
kinds. I argue that it still is. However, construct validity is not the only constraint 
shaping the experimental process; it is not the only desirable feature of experi-
mental paradigms. Investigators also want to ensure that their experiments are 
reliable, and that the data supports claims that have predictive validity or exter-
nal validity.16 In other words, there is not one specific constraint on experimental 
practices, but many different possible and even competing desiderata. Investiga-
tors are at liberty to decide which is/are most fundamental.
Using the aforementioned conceptual distinctions we can identify and analyze 
different kinds of conceptual, experimental and integrative practices across labo-
ratories, investigators, research studies and review/meta-analysis papers in the 
neurosciences of cognition and assess whether they are likely to promote the dis-
covery of natural kinds of cognitive capacities. Consider, for example, conceptual 
practices. One relevant question we might ask is, Are constructs designating cog-
nitive capacities deployed consistently across investigators? Although providing 
a thorough answer to this question requires assessing constructs on a case-by-
case basis, there is good evidence in the literature that the usage of theoretical 
terms designating cognitive capacities differs across investigators.17 In cognitive 
neurobiology, for example, a lexicon to broaden the meanings of terms designat-
ing different kinds of memory has been put forward because “terms in memory 
research are occasionally used in more than one way.”18 Broadening the class of 
phenomena to which a given construct refers does not, however, fix the lack of 
coordination across investigators with respect to how they use theoretical terms. 
Carrie Figdor19 puts the point nicely in claiming that the terms used to designate 
kinds of cognitive capacities do not have stable meanings; even if different inves-
tigators use the same term to refer to a kind of cognitive function or a kind of 
experiment, it does not mean that they intended to designate the “same” cognitive 
function by means of the term.
We encounter a similar lack of coordination when it comes to the experimental 
practices involved in the study of the brain areas that underlie cognitive capaci-
ties and the cellular and molecular mechanisms productive of those capacities. 
If different investigators begin with different ideas about what phenomenon a 
given construct designates, it likely shapes the experimental strategies they use to 
investigate that phenomenon. In fact, experimental paradigms and the protocols 
used in conjunction with them to produce instances of cognitive capacities in the 
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laboratory often do differ, sometimes in subtle ways, across investigators who 
claim to be studying the same phenomenon.20 Thus, it is possible that different 
investigators who claim to be investigating the same phenomenon are actually 
investigating different phenomena produced by different mechanisms.
Additionally, not all investigators engage in the process of construct explica-
tion. In cognitive neuroscience, for example, some investigators, especially those 
with backgrounds in cognitive psychology, do engage in a form of construct 
explication called “task analysis.”21 However, many cognitive neurobiologists 
rely instead on “intuitive judgments regarding the cognitive processes engaged 
by a given task.”22 Still others are more concerned with ensuring the reliability 
of their experiments rather than with construct validity. Thus, construct explica-
tion is not something that currently occurs across laboratories and investigators 
in either a consistent or coordinated way.23 In other words, the purported best 
strategy according to social scientists for developing taxonomies of kinds that 
correspond to real divisions in the causal structure of the world is not a common 
strategy in the neurosciences of cognition.
The aforementioned features of conceptual and experimental practices in the 
neurosciences of cognition have specific implications for integrative practices. 
Philosophers and scientists alike agree that mechanistic explanations of cogni-
tive capacities come about exclusively via the “integration” or combination of 
findings emanating from many different laboratories. However, the integrative 
accounts or mechanistic models of cognitive capacities that we find in review 
papers require investigators to abstract away from specific details of the various 
experimental contexts in which the data being integrated into these models was 
produced. In other words, insofar as these models abstract away from within-lab 
conceptual and experimental practices, the details of which are relevant to the 
mechanisms and types of capacities under study in a given laboratory, these mech-
anistic models are at best abstract representations of the mechanisms productive 
of an abstract cognitive capacity. Meta-analyses have similar limitations since 
data-mining techniques abstract away from specific features of the experimen-
tal paradigms used to produce cognitive capacities in order to arrive at general 
conclusions about the neuroanatomical locations of cognitive capacities or their 
cellular and molecular mechanisms.
The lack of coordination in scientific practice across investigators and laborato-
ries is suggestive that investigators working in the neurosciences of cognition are 
not aiming to discover natural kinds of cognitive capacities and their mechanisms. 
For, if they were, conceptual, experimental and integrative practices would be coor-
dinated across investigators so as to achieve this goal. From the perspective of 
experimental practice, then, the neurosciences of cognition currently do not appear 
to be interested in identifying natural kinds or providing accurate explanatory 
representations of cognitive capacities that carve nature at its joints. Conceptual, 
experimental and integrative practices would have to change radically across inves-
tigators if such accuracy were to be the goal.24 Thus, for the time being, there appear 
to be good grounds for a healthy anti-realism about the kinds of cognitive capacities 
and their mechanisms currently on offer in the neurosciences of cognition.
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